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Abstract
The framework presented in this paper takes its cue from recent ￿nancial events
and attempts to develop a tractable framework for policy analysis of macro-linkages,
in particular a ￿rst attempt at the integration of an independent pro￿t-maximising
banking sector that lends to and borrows from agents in the economy, and through
which changes in the monetary policy rate by the central bank are transmitted. The
inter-linkages between housing and the role of the banking sector in the transmis-
sion of monetary policy is emphasized. Two competing e⁄ects are highlighted: (i)
a ￿nancial accelerator channel, due to the presence of collateralized borrowers, and
(ii) a banking attenuator e⁄ect, which crucially arises from the spread in interest
rates caused by the introduction of monopolistically competitive ￿nancial interme-
diaries. We show how the classical ampli￿cation mechanism explored in models of
private borrowing between collaterally-constrained ￿ impatient￿households and un-
constrained ￿ patient￿households, such as those put forward by Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and Iacoviello (2005), is counteracted by the banking attenuator e⁄ect, given
an endogenous steady state spread between loan and savings rates. Attenuation
occurs therefore even under the assumption of ￿ exible interest rates. This e⁄ect
is further magni￿ed when sluggishness in the interest rate-setting mechanism is
introduced.
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11 Introduction
Recent years have borne witness to increasingly frequent episodes of ￿nancial turmoil,
characterized by contracted liquidity in the global banking system. The recent subprime
mortgage crisis has highlighted the detrimental e⁄ects on credit and spending induced
by the deterioration of bank balance sheets and those of other leveraged lenders. Central
bankers are particularly sensitive to the obvious possibility of negative feedback from
economic activity to the ￿nancial system, with the growing possibility of even more
severe second-round e⁄ects on the macroeconomy through reduced credit availability.
The framework presented in this paper takes its cue from recent ￿nancial events and
attempts to develop a tractable framework for policy analysis of macro-linkages, in par-
ticular a ￿rst attempt at the integration of an independent pro￿t-maximizing banking
sector that lends to and borrows from agents in the economy, and through which changes
in monetary policy are transmitted. Two competing e⁄ects are highlighted: (i) the stan-
dard ￿nancial accelerator channel, due to the presence of collateralized borrowing (against
durable goods), and (ii) a banking attenuator e⁄ect, which crucially arises from the spread
in interest rates caused by the introduction of monopolistically competitive ￿nancial in-
termediaries. We show analytically and numerically, via impulse response analysis, how
the classical ampli￿cation mechanism explored in models of private borrowing between
collaterally-constrained ￿ impatient￿households and unconstrained ￿ patient￿households,
such as those put forward by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli
(2008), is counteracted by the banking attenuator e⁄ect, given an endogenous steady
state spread between loan and savings rates. Attenuation occurs therefore even under
the assumption of ￿ exible interest rates. The impact of a monetary policy tightening in
a model with banking depresses the down payment necessary to increase borrowers￿con-
sumption of durable services by more than what is observed in models with direct credit
￿ ows between private agents. This e⁄ect is reinforced even further when sluggishness in
the interest rate-setting mechanism is introduced.
The recent crisis is remarkable not just for its propagation across credit markets and
its potency, but also because it has brought to the forefront numerous issues which have
been highlighted and commented on by economists for a number of years, but have never
been fully resolved. For example, understanding whether monetary authorities should
react to asset prices bubbles, particularly in the housing market, as well as the role
of monetary aggregates in informing and in￿ uencing central bank responses are both
features of the current crisis - yet they are old issues on which work has been steadily
progressing and developing. Most notably, the recent crisis has thrown the role of banks
as ￿nancial intermediaries into sharp relief. The breakdown of the link between monetary
policy instruments and the interbank lending rate has highlighted that any model which
attempts to analyze the traditionally healthy monetary transmission, now needs to include
2explicitly a ￿nancial sector that actively intermediates funds and provides vital structural
loans to all participants in the economy, be they households, ￿rms or even other ￿nancial
institutions.1
There is therefore a rich vein of topics waiting to be tapped by monetary economists,
and despite this plethora of issues, the ultimate aim of this paper is to provide a sim-
ple upgrade to the existing New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) framework2 as dubbed by
Goodfriend and King (1997). Recent events in particular provide a useful list of ingre-
dients for this upgrade, such that any micro-founded DSGE framework for the macro-
economy should ideally integrate the following at the simplest level: liquidity-constrained
households, durable goods (speci￿cally housing), and interest rate spreads generated by a
pro￿t-maximizing interest rate-setting banking sector with balance sheet considerations.3
The standard NNS is ultimately restricted since the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy remains limited to a single real interest rate channel on aggregate demand. This
means that a number of interesting issues are automatically excluded, namely interest
rate spreads, as well as the potential impact of such spreads in the face of other modelling
assumptions such as credit market imperfections, collateral and wealth e⁄ects linked to
the evolution of asset (house) prices and household heterogeneity in saving rates.
Constrained households and durable goods have already been introduced and ex-
plored in previous papers. Speci￿cally, Bernanke et al. (1996) developed the concept of
the ￿nancial accelerator, which emphasizes the role of collateral requirements in a⁄ecting
aggregate ￿ uctuations. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) built a general equilibrium model with
two types of agents (borrowers and savers) and introduced heterogeneity via di⁄erential
patience rates. Agents trade private debt intertemporally and collateral requirements
are motivated by the presence of limited enforcement. And building on Kiyotaki and
Moore￿ s work, Iacoviello (2005) actively linked their framework with the NNS, showing
how the role of nominal debt and asset prices are central for propagation of monetary
policy shocks. The model set out in this paper builds on the DSGE framework in Ia-
coviello (2005) but di⁄ers importantly in one respect - household debt no longer re￿ ects
intertemporal trading between an impatient borrower and a patient saver. Instead there
is a role for banks as explicit pro￿t-maximizing interest rate-setting agents that inter-
mediate funds, balancing loans and deposits via their balance sheet. The modelling of
durable goods used here follows from Barsky et al. (2007) and Monacelli (2008).
With regards the banking sector and interest rate spreads, some attempts have been
made to analyze the implications of broad money, banking and interest rate spreads in a
1In addition, it would appear that in the recent turmoil, liquidity management, typically treated by
central banks as a marginal operation, is now proving vital given the current urgent need for injections
of short-term funds into beleaguered interbank markets.
2See Woodford (2003) and Gal￿ (2008) for detailed expositions on the construction and mechanics of
New Keynesian DSGE models.
3The balance sheet would appear to be a crucial part of any speci￿cation of the banking sector, as it
is an important route for both understanding and introducing liquidity considerations.
3DSGE setting, most notably Goodfriend (2005) and Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) .
However, these papers have resorted to RBC-style loan production functions and price-
taking banks, which render loan rates as residual to the system of endogenous variables.
In particular, the banking sector, captured via the loan production function, enters via a
cash-in-advance constraint, without which the model reduces to the standard NNS frame-
work. Curdia and Woodford (2008) also use an intermediation technology to introduce a
spread between the lending and saving rate available to a continuum of households who
are indexed by the utility and disutility obtained from current expenditure and labor
respectively. However, the spread itself varies exogenously over time - despite di⁄erent
interpretations for the source of the spread. They also show that optimal spread-adjusted
monetary policy should typically target a weighted average of the di⁄erent interest rates
without much consideration for the credit spread itself.
Here we attempt to model a fully endogenous, monopolistically competitive banking
sector with a distinctly New Keynesian ￿ avor, where policy rate changes feed through
the ￿nancial intermediation sector to the rest of the economy via the rate of interest that
banks use to lend to one another.4 In the absence of borrowing and lending by the goods
sector,5 we can trace the impact of bank-determined interest rate spreads on monetary
transmission. Furthermore, these particular features should help to address some of the
questions and issues which the current crisis has forced into the open. For instance, what
are the implications for durable and non-durable consumption in the presence of banking?
How will the real economy react to changing spreads when interest rate adjustment by
banks is sluggish? What does the introduction of monopolistically competitive banks add
to the transmission mechanism highlighted by the literature on the ￿nancial accelerator?
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: section two provides a brief back-
ground to some of the key issues and characteristics addressed in the model and examines
why they are important to integrate into the framework; section three introduces the core
theoretical setting; section four discusses the di⁄erences between the bank and non-bank
settings of the model, and section ￿ve looks at the dynamics of the model economy un-
der di⁄erent shocks, with continued emphasis on the comparison between banking and
non-banking economies. The ￿nal section concludes.
4There is an important assumption underlying this particular formulation of the Taylor rule using the
interbank rate: changes to the policy rate have a one-to-one e⁄ect on the interbank lending rate. As is
very clear at the moment, there is an obvious divergence between central bank policy rates (e.g. the Fed
Funds rate in the US and the repo rate in the UK) and interbank rates (e.g. the London Interbank O⁄er
Rate, LIBOR). However, as this paper is concerned with the e⁄ects of introducing an interest rate-setting
banking sector into the NNS framework, this issue is temporarily side-stepped, and it is assumed that
monetary authorities can intervene directly in interbank markets to soak up excess supply and demand
using OMOs and subsequently set the interbank rate, RIB
t .
5An important next step is the modelling of the impact of spreads on production and output. For the
time being this paper abstracts from ￿nancially-constrained ￿rms and focuses on the impact of banking
on transmission and feedback in a simple DSGE model of household borrowing and lending.
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The recent ￿nancial storm has highlighted the crucial interactions between house prices,
collateralized debt and bank lending, as the main ingredients. This section reviews some
of the ￿ndings on these factors and ends by proposing a modelling strategy for tackling
the related policy debate.
2.1 Housing
It is well documented that the value of mortgage debt represents a signi￿cant portion of
outstanding household debt (e.g. Calza et al. (2007)), such that in OECD countries the
share has increased from 60% to 75% between 1952 and 2005. Co-movement between
consumption and house prices is also a well documented ￿nding (Aoki et al. (2004)). It
is self-evident in the most recent housing market boom that households were consciously
raising consumption on the back of drastic house price increases. Moreover, the sizeable
increases in house prices combined with an unprecedented rise in household debt are
typically mutually reinforcing.
A large part of the observed increase in consumer borrowing has primarily been in
the form of collateralized debt. The rise in house prices has induced households to
increasingly extract equity from their accumulated assets, encouraging further borrowing
against realized capital gains. Dynamics of this sort have been considered important in
sustaining the level of private spending in several countries, especially during the business
cycle downturn of 2001. However, the implications of a housing bust, coinciding with a
complicated deterioration of credit markets (either exacerbated by or causing them), are
still to be understood. In light of this, one focus of this paper is to unravel how changes
in house prices in response to various shocks may directly impact on consumption via
credit market e⁄ects, speci￿cally bank lending.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) have highlighted the role of collateralized and un-
collateralized external ￿nance premia as signi￿cant factors in driving business cycle ￿ uc-
tuations. In this paper, we are interested in housing (durable goods) as collateral as
opposed both collateralized and uncollateralized spreads in borrowing rates - all borrow-
ing is collateralized in the framework presented here, and there can be no uncollateralized
borrowing by constrained households. When the value of housing acts as collateral, an
increase in house prices makes more collateral available to homeowners, which in turn
encourages them to borrow more to ￿nance their desired level of consumption. The
increase in house prices may itself be caused by a variety of factors, including an unan-
ticipated reduction in real interest rates, which lowers the rate at which future housing
services are discounted. Taylor (2007) suggests that a sustained period of exceptionally
low short-term interest rates between 2003 and 2004 may have played an important role
in the rise of the housing market bubble. As noted by Jarocinski and Smets (2008),
5the recent ￿nancial turmoil, triggered by the exceptionally high sequence of defaults in
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United States, has fostered an increasing interest
in the role of the housing market in the economy and on how monetary policy should
respond to misalignments in house prices from their equilibrium level so as to prevent the
occurrence of non-fundamental dynamics.
Given the uncertainty over wealth e⁄ects6 and the importance of housing, it is very
clear that monetary policymakers must consider housing market developments, despite
the traditional caveats about responding to asset prices.7
2.2 Bank Lending and Interest Rate Spreads
Given our focus on integrating banking into the NNS framework, it is important to review
what has come before on banking and ￿nancial intermediation within economics. The
economic analysis of the banking industry has traditionally placed strong emphasis on
the importance of ￿nancial intermediaries in the provision of credit and the special nature
of bank loans. In macroeconomics the role of credit has been widely explored within the
strand of the monetary economics that deals with the credit channel of the transmission
mechanism (see Blinder and Stiglitz (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988)). Accord-
ing to this credit view, in conditions of asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders, monetary policy actions a⁄ect the external ￿nance premium through the balance
sheet channel and the bank lending channel. While the former emphasizes the relevance
of borrowers￿balance sheets,8 the bank lending channel highlights the importance of
liabilities on the banks￿balance sheet in channeling macroeconomic ￿ uctuations.
Speci￿cally, the bank lending channel suggests that monetary policy a⁄ects the real
economy not only through the impact of the interest rate changes on aggregate demand,
but also through impacts on bank liabilities (reservable deposits in Kashyap and Stein
(1995); bank equity in Van den Heuvel (2002)) which can lead to shifts in the supply
of credit and bank loans, particularly loans from the commercial banking sector. An
important assumption is that banks are assumed to play a special role in the ￿nancial
system as primary lender to a wide range of individuals and sectors (referred to as ￿ bank-
dependent borrowers￿ ). A second assumption is that banks typically fund a fraction of
6Wealth e⁄ects arising from changes in the value of housing are still contested within central banks
and the academic literature.
7The Federal Reserve has typically advocated against ￿ leaning into the wind￿when considering its
response to asset price bubbles. The argument is that it is di¢ cult to assess which asset prices to
respond to and what their equilibrium or fundamental level is. The preference has traditionally been to
use monetary policy to engage in ￿ cleaning-up￿once the bubbles have burst, as in 1987, 1990-91, 1997
and 2001.
8This is notionally di⁄erent to the bank balance sheet channel we discuss later in the paper. The
most prominent line of work in this strand of the literature is the one developed by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989, 1995), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kocherlakota (2000), Cooley et al. (2004).
6their loans with liabilities (such as deposits) that carry reserve requirements. By reducing
bank reserves, a monetary policy tightening lowers the level of ￿ reservable￿deposits banks
can take on when reserve requirements are binding. The decrease in reservable liabilities
will in turn lead banks to reduce lending if they cannot easily switch to alternative forms
of ￿nance or liquidate assets other than loans. Therefore, as Van den Heuvel (2007)
notes, the two necessary conditions for a bank lending channel to be operative is that
reserve requirements are binding and that the market for non-reservable bank liabilities is
not frictionless. Otherwise, banks could simply replace funding from reservable liabilities
(e.g. deposits) with liabilities that have no reserve requirements, thereby allowing the
bank to continue to exploit any pro￿table lending opportunities that might arise even if
it faced a binding reserve requirement.
Another important issue regarding monetary transmission and banks is inertia in
interest rate changes, which are often found to be sticky, such that they do not respond
immediately or fully to changes in the corresponding reference market rates against which
they are priced. Berger and Udell (1992) focus on the response of credit rates, and show
that a 1% increase in the T-Bill rate only induces a 0:5% response in credit rates. This
has important monetary policy implications, as changes in the monetary policy rate may
not be fully re￿ ected in the interest rates banks o⁄er their customers. Moreover, Hannan
and Berger (1991), and Borio and Fritz (1995) show that stickiness increases with market
concentration. This evidence shifts our attention to a class of models that stresses the
role of the competitive regime in the banking industry and its implications for the interest
rate setting mechanism.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) provide a ￿rst attempt to embed a fully-speci￿ed
(perfectly competitive) banking sector into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
framework. The aim of their paper, as of this one, was to quantify the e⁄ects of bank-
ing in general equilibrium, in terms of both its steady state implications and dynamic
properties. In particular, the model characterizes steady-state interest rate spreads given
key assumptions regarding the loan production function and the degree of substitutabil-
ity between collateral and monitoring e⁄ort. Moreover, they show that the e⁄ects of
exogenous shocks can be ampli￿ed or attenuated due to changes in the external ￿nance
premium (EFP). Two competing forces are at work. A positive monetary shock raises
asset prices, which leads to a rise in the collateral value and subsequently the supply of
loans - this reduces the EFP. The initial impulse also raises aggregate demand and the
demand for deposits, and hence the amount of banking services that are provided - this
raises the EFP. The latter e⁄ect dominates leading to the EFP rising, and so the e⁄ects
of the shock are attenuated.
From the perspective of introducing a fully ￿ edged pro￿t maximizing banking sector
into a DSGE model for the analysis of the interdependence between housing, credit and
banks￿balance sheet, we ￿nd it key to introduce an element of imperfect competition in
7the banking industry. Huelsewig et al. (2006) analyze e⁄ects of bank behavior on the
supply side of the economy in a general equilibrium setting. In that paper, banks supply
loans to ￿rms that must pay their wage bills before they receive revenues from selling
their output, leading to the so-called cost channel of monetary policy transmission. We
exploit an analogous mechanism in a model featuring credit market frictions in the form
of collateralized borrowing on the demand side of the economy. Moreover, compared to
the steady state evidence provided by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), where interest
rate di⁄erentials are a⁄ected by the marginal value of collateral, the interest rate spread
generated by our model depends upon the degree of competitive pressure in the banking
sector (through the elasticity of substitution between bank loans), as well as by the reserve
requirement.
2.3 A Modelling Perspective
We now brie￿ y preview how we hope to integrate the disparate factors related to bank-
ing, borrowing and housing in a DSGE setting. Durable goods and collateral constraints
following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2008) are an ob-
vious starting point. Their ￿ multi-representative agent￿frameworks with collaterally-
constrained consumers can explain positive elasticities of consumption to housing wealth.
Constrained (impatient) households value current consumption more than unconstrained
(patient) households and can therefore raise borrowing and consumption more than pro-
portionally when housing prices increase, leading to positive e⁄ects on aggregate demand
from asset price rises.
For the banking sector, we introduce independent pro￿t-maximizing and interest-rate
setting banks, as mentioned above. By modelling loans and deposits as the outcome of
optimizing behavior, we can introduce interest rates beyond the single bond rate prevalent
in NNS models, as well as interest rates which are determined separately and indepen-
dently of the instrument rate. The use of an aggregate bank balance sheet allows for
the possibility of liquidity injections into the ￿nancial sector, with obvious spillovers into
lending and credit for households.
Banks will be modelled along the lines of the simple Industrial Organization (IO)
models of banking as set out in Freixas and Rochet (1997). The problem is one of
constrained optimization, where the pro￿ts for the jth bank are calculated as interest
income earned from loans net of interest paid on deposits. In the simplest setting, pro￿ts,
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where Lj;t represent mortgage loans, BIB
j;t captures interbank (net) lending to other banks,
and Dj;t are deposits made at the jth bank by households. RIB
t is the interbank lending
8rate and will be the policy rate in the model, while RL
j;t is the bank-determined loan rate
facing borrowers, and RD
t is the deposit rate paid by savers. Maximization is subject
to the constraint that the bank balances it assets and liabilities. The former comprises
the various loans made to households as well as to other banks, while the latter includes




j;t = Dj;t: (2)
Within this pro￿t-maximizing setting, we speci￿cally implement a monopolistically
competitive banking framework with staggered interest rate adjustment. For the purposes
of this paper, and in order to track more easily the changes in transmission that come
with adding banks to the system, we only allow banks the power to set the loan rate, and
not the deposit rate. Control of the latter rate could be introduced with little additional
complication. In the case of ￿ exible price-setting (zero stickiness), the loan rate will be a
mark-up over the deposit rate, and this gives us the crucial spread between interest rates
faced by households. Once stickiness is introduced, this spread can vary over time.
It is clear that our model features deposits as the only source of funding for the lending
activities of the whole banking sector. Therefore, a monetary policy tightening necessarily
acts through a quasi-bank lending channel (which we later re-christen the bank balance
sheet channel), by determining an equal reduction in deposits and household debt in the
form of loans (mortgages).
3 The Model
This section sets out the model to be discussed in this paper. As to the demand side,
there are two types of consumer: patient households and impatient households, which
are di⁄erentiated by the discount factor with which they discount their future stream
of instantaneous utility.9 The supply side is populated by monopolistically competitive
￿rms producing intermediate goods, as well as a perfectly competitive ￿nal goods produc-
tion sector. Moreover, there is a ￿nancial intermediation sector, specializing in extending
loans and mortgages to collaterally-constrained impatient households, and a monopolisti-
cally competitive banking sector, which provides lendable resources to the intermediaries.
Money is also included in this model via money-in-utility (MIU) as justi￿ed by Kiyotaki
and Wright (1989).
9Ramsey (1928) postulates that if two dynasties have di⁄erent discount rates and a loan market is
in operation, then "equilibrium would be attained by a division of society into two classes, the thrift
enjoying bliss and the improvident at the subsistence level". Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987)
con￿rm this conjecture, by designing dynamic general equilibrium frameworks where two classes of agents





















Diagram summarising various relations in basic 2-agent version of the
banking model
3.1 Consumers
There are two households in the economy:
1. Patient households, who are ￿nancially unconstrained and consume as standard per-
manent income households would. They choose how much to deposit with banks
(save) and receive all residual pro￿ts from the monopolistically competitive inter-
mediate goods producers and monopolistically competitive banks;
2. Impatient households, who are credit-constrained and borrow from ￿nancial inter-
mediaries using their holdings of durable goods as collateral. They also earn wages
from renting their labor to the intermediate goods sector;
Household debt no longer represents intertemporal trading between the di⁄erent types
of household. In this model, the important ￿nancial (credit) choice variables of the
household, deposits, dt, and the amount of borrowing (or saving) by impatient households,
lt, are linked through the aggregate balance sheet of the banking sector. This crucial link
provides an explicit role for monopolistically competitive interest-rate setting banks to
intermediate funds across the economy.10
10An obvious extension to this framework, would be the introduction of working capital loans to the
goods sector, as set out in the cost channel literature (see Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), Ravenna
and Walsh (2006)).
103.1.1 Patient Households
The preferences of the representative patient household are de￿ned over a nondurable
consumption good (CP
t ), housing services (HP
t ) and labor (NP
t ). These households max-















































is the discount factor. Parameter ’P denotes the inverse of the elasticity of substitution

























where Pt is the price of nondurable goods, Dt indicates end-of-period deposits which
earn an interest RD
t , payable at the start of period t+1; QH
t is the nominal price of durables
(housing), and ￿B
t and ￿G
t are dividends (pro￿ts) remitted to patient households by the
















Patient households enter each period with MP
t￿1 nominal money balances, receive transfers
from the central government, T P
t = MP
t ￿MP
t￿1, and earn W P
t for their labor input to the
goods sector. Note that housing does not depreciate across time and so we have assumed
perfect durability of housing. Furthermore, XP
t denotes the purchase of new durables








where we assume that there is perfect durability, i.e. durable goods do not depreciate.


































































the gross in￿ ation rate. The ￿rst order conditions for this agent are as follows:11
11UP














































































t is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. As in the standard
NNS framework, we recover dynamic Euler equations, which together with the budget
constraint and the appropriate transversality conditions, characterize equilibrium dynam-
ics for the patient household.12
Patient savers therefore operate in perfect ￿nancial markets, not su⁄ering from any
collateral constraints with respect to their borrowing. We can show analytically that
patient consumption will co-move with durable goods prices, which shows up later in all
impulse responses. This feature, however, will not be present with impatient borrowers,
for whom this mechanism is de-linked due to the presence of the collateral constraint.
We can see this perfect co-movement between asset prices and non-durable consumption














Barsky et al. (2007) examine the interplay between intertemporal substitution and the
purchases of durable and non-durable goods. They note, as recalled later by Calza et al.
(2007), that in the case of durables with low depreciation rates,13 the right hand-side of
(12) is heavily in￿ uenced by the marginal utilities of durable service ￿ ows in the distant
future. When shocks hitting the economy (and their e⁄ects) are temporary, the forward-
looking terms in (12) do not deviate from their steady-state values, and so even signi￿cant
variation in the ￿rst few terms only have a small impact on the present value. As Barsky
12It is useful to point out that we also include a private bond, Bt and the corresponding bond rate,
Rt, in the system. This allows us to compare the responses of the single interest rate in the non-bank
formulation with the deposit rate in the model with banks, since this bond rate is identical to the deposit
rate, delivering an identical Euler and steady state.
13Technically, we assume a zero depreciation rate for durable goods (perfect durability), which implies
an in￿nite stock-￿ ow ratio.
12et al. (2007) point out, this means the present value remains constant (or invariant) even
in the face of substantial temporary movements in UP
H;t+j.14 And so given that the right
hand side of (12) remain fairly constant following any temporary shock, any variation in
asset prices immediately impacts on the marginal utility of consumption. Speci￿cally, as
asset prices rise, UP
C;t must fall, which means that patient non-durable consumption will
rise.
3.1.2 Impatient Households
Preferences of the representative impatient household are de￿ned over consumption of the
￿nal non-durable good (CI
t ), housing services (HI
t ) and labor (NI
t ). Impatient households



















































I) is the intertemporal discount factor. Parameter ’I is as for the patient agents.




















Impatient households enter period t with Lt of nominal debt (or mortgage), which has
been borrowed from the bank, and will pay RL
t gross nominal interest on this debt at the
start of t + 1. They increase their housing holdings by ￿HI
t at the nominal price QH
t ,
and earn W I
t NI
t from working in the goods sector. Once again these consumers receives
transfers from the government, T I
t = MI
t ￿ MI
t￿1 and we use XI
t to denote the purchase
of new durables, where durables accumulate as follows: HI
t = XI
t + HI








































Borrowing is restricted by the additional collateral constraint:
R
L






which in real terms becomes
14This approximation is equivalent to saying that the demand for durable goods displays an almost
in￿nite elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Even a small rise in the price of the durable today relative













that is, the maximum amount of borrowable resources is equal to a fraction of the value
of housing holdings available at the start of period t. Parameter ￿I denotes the margin
requirement or loan-to-value ratio.






















































































t is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. In Section 4, we will
analyze how the collateral constraint a⁄ects the choice between nondurable and durable
consumption, and how this in turn is a⁄ected by the introduction of banks into the model.
When linearized, (8), (10), (18) and (20) together with the aggregate resource constraint
(and the ￿xed supply of housing), will correspond to the demand-side or ￿IS￿portion of
the standard three equation ￿IS-PC-MR￿NNS model.
3.2 Financial Intermediation and Banking
We now set out the speci￿cs of the banking sector and the system of ￿nancial inter-
mediation used. The set-up is deliberately New Keynesian in nature and exploits the
existing approach traditionally applied to the goods sector. The key di⁄erence emerges
in the ￿ intermediate￿banking sector, which is made up of a continuum of monopolistically
competitive banks who maximize pro￿ts subject to a balance sheet constraint. Instead of
being a passive agent of monetary transmission, these intermediate banks are independent
bodies which react optimally to the economic environment. We assume furthermore that
they are subject to Calvo-type staggered interest rate adjustment, which yields a ￿ New
Keynesian￿interest rate-setting curve, where the change in current loan rates depend on
the change in expected future loan rates as well as the spread between the current loan
rates and the interbank rate (which is taken in this framework as a proxy for the policy
14rate as in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007)).
3.2.1 Loan Demand
The ￿nal bank sector can be viewed as the ultimate mortgage provider, e.g. a retail
bank in the UK, or Countrywide Financial in the USA. This sector e⁄ectively bundles
loans from the intermediate banking sector and issues them directly to the collaterally-
constrained the impatient households. Ultimately, this sector allows us, as in the case
of the goods sector, to derive algebraically from microfounded behavior the impatient
consumers￿demand for loans, rather than postulate it.
Loan providers are taken to be perfectly competitive and act to aggregate mortgages
































We next derive the optimal relations for loan supply by pro￿t-maximizing banks that
choose interest rates subject to a binding balance sheet constraint. We show how loan
rate stickiness is introduced by assuming that banks operating in a customer market face
nominal frictions as in Calvo (1983). Each bank resets its loan rate only with a probability
1 ￿ ￿ each period, independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus,
each period a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of banks reset their loan rates, while a fraction ￿ keep their




















j;t is the loan rate chosen by banks who are able to adjust.


































Maximization is subject to the bank balance sheet constraint:
Lj;t + B
IB
j;t + Hj;t = X
CB
j;t + Dj;t; (25)
where Hj;t is high-powered money, itself de￿ned as:
Hj;t = ￿j;t;
where ￿j;t are cash reserves transferred by bank j on its account at the Central Bank, i.e.
the bank-speci￿c amount of fractional reserves. ￿j;t typically bears no interest15 and is
therefore optimally chosen at its minimal level de￿ned by the regulator:
￿j;t = ￿Dj;t; 0 < ￿ < 1;






j;t + (1 ￿ ￿)Dj;t:
The bank￿ s balance sheet therefore tells us how the jth bank can obtain funding in
three ways: (i) it receives cash injections (XCB
j;t ) from the monetary authority, where
XCB
j;t = ￿Dj;t; (ii) it can obtain funds on the interbank market, where the net position of
the jth bank on the interbank market is denoted by BIB
j;t , and ￿nally (iii) banks receive
deposits from patient households. Changes in the ￿rst source of funding is closest in
spirit to the bank lending channel, in which central banks very bank reserves to a⁄ect
loan supply.
For the dynamic analysis later, we add an iid shock, "x
t, to the bank balance sheet.
This is to capture the impact of exogenous changes in balance sheet liquidity and could
be useful when attempting to unravel the implications from the recent contraction in
15As part of the emergency measures granted to the Federal Reserve by the US Treasury Department
and Congress, was the ability to pay interest on reserves that banks maintain at the central bank.
This enables the Fed to pump almost unlimited cash into the money market without fear of interest
rates falling to zero, as they did in Japan during its lost decade. This is new instrument for monetary
policy which we can partly capture within our framework by altering the pro￿ts that the bank earns.
The balance sheet of the bank remains unchanged, however, there will be an e⁄ect on the equilibrium
determination of the deposit rate with implications for bank pro￿ts.
16In the literature, ￿ is a regularly-commented on, but little-used, tool of monetary policy. As the
speci￿cation stands, ￿ has not been endogenised. However, to do so would require little complication
and its endogenisation is saved for future work.
16balance sheets. The loan demand curve (22) from the ￿nal banking sector also serves as
an additional constraint for maximization and the interbank rate RIB
t and deposit rate,
RD
t , are both taken as given by the banking sector.
After denoting with ￿B
t the Lagrange multiplier associated to the balance sheet iden-



























Lj;t+k = 0: (28)
We ￿nd that the interbank rate is the adjusted deposit rate, where the factor of adjust-








Therefore when linearized, price-taking behavior by banks with respect to the deposit
rate, means that the deposit and interbank rates are equal ( ^ RIB
t = ^ RD
t ), and so changes
in the policy rate translate one-to-one to changes in the deposit rate.
Linearizing the ￿rst order condition with respect to RL
t and combining it with the
aggregate loan rate (23) we obtain the previously-mentioned ￿ New Keynesian￿interest





















while under ￿ exible interest rates, we ￿nd that ^ RL
t = ^ RIB
t = ^ RD
t , as expected.
3.2.3 Loan Supply and Demand
Given the collateral constraints and the staggered adjustment of interest rates, we have
linearized relations which de￿ne loan supply and loan demand functions in
h




In the case of mortgage demand we obtain a downward-sloping relation between ^ RL
t and
^ lt:




t+1 + ^ H
I





Mortgage supply, as derived from the Banking sector, is however perfectly elastic, and






















3.3.1 Final Good Producers
The aggregate non-durable good is produced by perfectly competitive ￿rms and requires






















is the price index consistent with the ￿nal good producer
earning null pro￿ts.
3.3.2 Intermediate Goods Production
A continuum of ￿rms produces intermediate goods. Shares of these ￿rms are owned by
patient households. Each ￿rm i 2 [0;1] employs labor (supplied by patient and impatient












where At is a total factor productivity shifter, NP
i;t is the ￿rm-speci￿c total demand for
patient household labor, and NI
i;t is the ￿rm-speci￿c total demand for impatient household
labor. Price setting behavior in this sector is detailed below.
3.3.3 Pricing of Intermediate Goods
Each intermediate good ￿rm has monopolistic power in the production of its own variety








Yt, ￿rst proposed by Rotemberg (1982), where ￿ is the steady state
in￿ ation rate and where the parameter ￿ measures the degree of nominal price rigidity.
As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, intermediate goods producers solve a
two-stages budgeting problem. Given W P
t , W I
t they rent NP
i;t, NI
i;t in perfectly competitive












































































i;t are the nominal pro￿ts of ￿rm i which will be transferred to shareholders in the
form of dividends, TCi;t = W P
t NP
i;t + W I
t NI
i;t are the total cost of production, and ￿ = 1
is the steady state of gross in￿ ation; and where the stochastic discount factor (SDF) is











. The terms on the right-hand side are, respectively,
revenue from sales to ￿nal goods ￿rms, the wage bill to patient and impatient households,
and the quadratic cost of changing prices.






and to (32). The
optimum ￿rm-speci￿c price is given by:































t is the Lagrange multiplier on the demand constraint and ￿t is the gross
aggregate in￿ ation rate. Notice that all ￿rms employ an identical capital/labor ratio in
equilibrium. The Lagrange multiplier mcG
t plays the role of the real marginal cost of
production and in a symmetric equilibrium it must hold that Pi;t = Pt. The linearized
form of this ￿rst order condition therefore gives us a New Keynesian Phillips Curve:






3.4 The Government-Monetary Authority



















As in the standard New Keynesian literature, the government achieves such rules via open
market operations (OMOs). These operations are ￿nanced by lump-sum cash transfers,
XCB
t , to the banking sector as well as money transfers to the two households, T P
t and
T I
t , such that any de￿cits are equal to zero.
193.5 Market Clearing and Aggregation
This section lists the market-clearing conditions. The aggregate resource constraint covers
the goods market clearing:









where Ct = CI
t + CP
t . The supply of durable goods is held ￿xed for the analysis that





t = H = 1: (41)















For the banking sector, we have the crucial money market clearing condition which re-
places the traditional inter-household lending-borrowing clearing condition. This balance
sheet embodies the idea of the banking sector intermediating funds within the economy
between agents. It states that the supply of deposits and loans must be equal in every
period, and this constraint must be satis￿ed by banks in their pro￿t maximization:





j;t dj ￿ B
IB
t = 0: (44)
4 The Model With and Without Banks
The preceding section set out a model of two durable good-accumulating households
(patient, impatient), a standard New Keynesian non-durable goods sector with sticky
goods prices, and a banking sector with staggered interest rate-setting. In addition, we
have introduced broad money via money-in-utility following. The full linearized system
therefore constitutes 23 equations with 23 variables. When examining the e⁄ects of
monetary policy, we can decompose the model into simpler variants which can be used to
analyze how the introduction of additional sectors and assumptions alter the traditional
responses of major macroeconomic variables. The natural progression therefore will be:
(1) a model of collateralized borrowing without banks, (2) the same model with the
introduction of banks, and ￿nally (3) the model with banks in the presence of ￿ exible
and sticky interest rate-setting.
20The ￿rst step of introducing collaterally-constrained agents was explored by Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) and nested in the New Keynesian framework by Iacoviello (2005). The
basic two-agent framework set up here di⁄ers from the two-agent problem in Iacoviello
(2005) which consisted of patient households and entrepreneurs - the latter borrowed for
consumption and engaged in production using durable goods as well as labor in produc-
tion. The output form these entrepreneurs was sold to retailers who marked up prices in
a staggered way, thereby introducing the New Keynesian element of price stickiness. Here
our agents have more in common with Monacelli (2008), where the constrained agent does
not engage in production, and instead merely provides elastic labor to a separate goods
sector, the pro￿ts of which are remitted to the patient households (and owners of these
￿rms). Impatient households are constrained in their borrowing, which is undertaken to
supplement their labor income in order to fund current consumption of both durables
and non-durables.
In the absence of banks, households return to the familiar pattern of trading their
debt intertemporally between one another, and there is no divergence in interest rates
such that the deposit rate for patient savers equals the loan rate for impatient borrowers,
RD
t = RL
t = Rt. Both households borrow and save at the same rate of interest, Rt,
which is set by the monetary authority via OMOs.17 This is the same as the single
aggregate interest rate speci￿cation of the standard NNS. Equilibrium borrowing and
lending between both types of household is now simply bP
t = bI
t , where bP
t denotes patient
saving and bI
t denotes impatient borrowing. This is used instead of the equilibrium (real)
bank balance sheet: lt = dt.
4.1 Deterministic Steady State
The steady states of the system can be solved for analytically, and are laid out in Appendix
B. In particular, we are able to recover steady state expressions for the various interest
rates in the system. We ￿nd that the mortgage rate is a mark-up over the interbank rate














P (1 ￿ ￿)(￿H ￿ 1)
; (45)
since ￿H > 1, such that
￿H






2RIB < 0, re￿ ecting the fact that the market power of the jth bank diminishes
as the elasticity of substitution increases. We also ￿nd that as the reserve requirement
17The rate, Rt, is plotted in the impulse responses as the bond rate and is used to compare the deposit
rate in the bank model with the single interest rate of the non-bank model, since ^ Rt = ^ RD
t in the bank
model (from the ￿rst order conditions of the patient household when a private bond is also included).







￿P > 0. Therefore the spread
between the interbank rate and the loan rate is simply a function of the parameters that
characterize the system - this mark-up is parallel in the non-durable goods sector where
price is a mark-up over marginal cost.
In addition, these gross nominal interest rates are equal to the gross real interest rates,
since in￿ ation is assumed to equal zero in the steady state: ￿ = 1 + ￿ = 1, where ￿ is
the steady state (net) rate of in￿ ation and ￿ is steady state gross in￿ ation.
An important point to turn to in this section is how our setup guarantees positive
consumption by both agents as well as a unique, determinate level of debt held by the
impatient borrower in the steady state. It turns out the combination of di⁄erential
discount rates, where the borrower is more impatient than the saver, and the presence of
binding collateral constraints ensures that both these characteristics are present.
Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987) initially set out how the long-run steady
state of the income distribution in a heterogeneous agents model, where heterogeneity is
characterized by di⁄erent discount rates across households, is determined by the house-
hold with the lowest discount rate. Furthermore, if discount rates are equal then the
steady state income distribution would be indeterminate. This notion also appeared as
the ￿ unit root￿problem in the literature for small open economies with incomplete inter-
national asset markets, which has been addressed by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003)
among others.18
In addition, as Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) explain, in a model of heterogeneous
discount rates but no constraints to borrowing, the impatient household￿ s debt to the
lender, which in our case is the banking sector (or alternatively the patient household
in a model without banks) increases over time to the maximum level the borrower can
service via labor income. The introduction of binding collateral constraints restricts
the level of debt such that the economy possesses a unique steady state with positive
consumption by both households. Therefore a combination of determinate debt under
di⁄erent discount rates, enhanced by positive steady state consumption when collateral
constraints are deployed, serve to return a unique, determinate and stable steady state
path for debt and consumption by both households.
This shopping list for determinacy therefore imposes certain restrictions for the pa-
rameters in our model. From the ￿rst order condition (18), the collateral constraint will
be binding in the steady state if and only if ￿
I < 1
RL since:
18Lubik (2007), in particular, gives an example of the canonical small open economy model, where a
steady state exists only if the product of the discount factor and the exogenous foreign interest rate equal
one, ￿R￿ = 1. Furthermore, the steady-state level of one of the control variables, namely net foreign
assets (debt, l, in our model), is not pinned down by the model￿ s optimality conditions. and so there are












If this restriction is not satis￿ed and instead ￿
IRL = 1, then ￿I = 0 meaning that the
constraint would not bind and the level of borrowing by impatient households would be
indeterminate and not always positive in the steady state.19
Therefore, the model is calibrated such that the multiplier on the collateral constraint,
￿I, is positive in the steady state. In fact, the relative size of the discount factors, as well
as the elasticity of substitution, ￿H, are all important when determining the collateral












Therefore (47) shows how the right hand-side inequality is the result of bank-determined
interst rate spreads, and the left hand inequaility arises due to the binding collateral
constraint.
We also carry out simulations to explore the sign of the multiplier and as in Iacoviello
(2005), we recover a broad range of parameters for which the multiplier is positive in
the steady state and we use this result to con￿rm that locally the collateral constraint
is binding. In e⁄ect, the collateral constraint may bind only occasionally. However, it
always binds if the economy remains close to its nonstochastic steady state; so follow-
ing Campbell and Hercowitz (2005), Iacoviello (2005) and Monacelli (2008), standard
￿rst-order approximation techniques, speci￿cally log-linearization, can characterize the
equilibrium of the model in the presence of small disturbances and ￿ low￿uncertainty.
We can also try and impute (or calibrate) the value of ￿H from the empirical mean of
the spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate. If we let sL ￿ RL ￿ RD denote
the spread (margin) between the two interest rates faced by the household. Using the








(￿H ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (48)
Assuming ￿ ! 0 (i.e. negligible or zero reserve requirement), then we can ￿nd the




sL + 1: (49)
Given the endogenous interest rate spread generated by the pro￿t-maximising banking







19This is equivalent to requiring that RL < 1
￿I where 1
￿I would have been the steady state loan rate
in the absence of the collateral constraint.
23has implications for the calibration of ￿, which we will discuss later.
4.2 Collateral Constraint E⁄ects with Banking Attenuation
Given that this framework builds on the foundations of Monacelli (2008) it is useful
to highlight the key mechanisms at work given the presence of banks:20 The collateral
constraint channel can potentially act to accelerate the e⁄ects from policy changes. For
example, looser monetary policy that stimulates asset prices (in our case house prices)
can loosen the collateral constraint. Constrained households who value current consump-
tion more than future consumption might therefore be capable of raising borrowing and
consumption more than proportionally when asset prices rise - and so increases in asset
prices could have positive e⁄ects on aggregate demand. However, this e⁄ect is modi￿ed
in the presence of a banking sector which drives a wedge between interest rates charged
to each household.
In order to understand how the collateral constraint channel is modi￿ed in the presence
of banks, we examine the dynamic system of equations facing impatient households. First
we look at the intertemporal e⁄ects on consumption of non-durable goods. From the
linearized impatient consumption Euler:
^ C
I
































We can see that as the multiplier increases and the collateral constraint tightens (^ ￿
I
t "),
impatient household demand for non-durable goods falls. This linearized Euler contrasts
to that under the model without banks:
^ C
I



































A tightening of the constraint (an increase in the multiplier) will lead to a larger fall in
consumption in the presence of banks if RL > 1
￿P , which is always satis￿ed when the
collateral constraint is binding in the steady state.






the presence of banks. Starting with the impatient household demand for housing (20),
we can assume that the multiplier can be decomposed into the multiplier on the budget





t. In addition we can rewrite some
20Monacelli (2008) uses his two-person framework without banks to understand the co-movement
problem that occurs in the presence of durable goods￿price stickiness and perfect ￿nancial markets
without constrained borrowing: namely, durable consumption is found to contract (as expected) following
a monetary policy tightening and subsequently does not co-move with nondurable consumption, which
rises. This is at odds with the empirics. Once collateral constraints are introduced, positive co-movement
between durable and nondurable consumption is recovered.





































We can see how the presence of the multiplier increases the MRS and ￿ de-links￿it
from asset price movements. In the absence of the collateral constraint we would have a
one-to-one relationship between the relative price of durables, qH
t , and the MRS.
We can also obtain a richer expression which shows how the MRS (and user cost) also




by combining (20) and (18). This gives us



































As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we can now see how the user cost captures the ￿ down
payment￿required to purchase a unit of durable (services), which is the di⁄erence between
the ￿ collateral-adjusted￿price of the land and the e⁄ective ￿ collateral-adjusted￿amount
that can be borrowed against the additional unit of durables. Linearizing (53) gives us




















































From the nondurable Euler, we know that !I = 1
RL ￿ ￿
I. Therefore, in the model
with banks the constraint binds when 1
RL > ￿















































21We can see that ￿I




















Therefore, a tightening of the collateral constraint, captured via an increase in the mul-
tiplier, ^ !
I


















and so we see a substitution away from durables to non-durables.
In the absence of banks 1
RL = ￿
P since there is there is only one interest rate in the
economy (RL = RD = R), and so the multiplier, !I, equals ￿
P ￿ ￿
















and it is always the case that ￿I
NO BANKS < ￿I
BANKS. Therefore, we can see that the
introduction of banks actually attenuates the increase in the MRS which arises from a


























Given expression (55) for the impatient household￿ s MRS, we can also show how the
e⁄ect of a rise in the policy rate (a monetary policy tightening) is attenuated in the
presence of a banking sector with ￿ exible interest rate setting ( ^ RL
t = ^ RIB
t ). From (55),
the marginal e⁄ect of ^ RL

























This is always greater than zero (RL > 1 and 1 > ￿
IRL). For analogous arguments, a rise
in ^ !
I
t (a tightening of the collateral constraint) means that the user cost rises. Comparing
the relative impact of the policy rate in the model with and without banking, we ￿nd
that following responses can be computed in each case (in the bank model, ^ RIB
t ￿ ^ Rt):
@^ ￿t
@ ^ Rt



























￿ > 0: (58)

























which is always satis￿ed. Therefore, we can see how the presence of banks in a model
of constrained and unconstrained households can cause attenuation of the e⁄ects of a
rise in the policy rate on the marginal rate of substitution between housing services and
consumption. The presence of banks means that the substitution away from durables to
non-durables is relatively lower when monetary policy is contractionary. As
￿H
￿H￿1 is the
markup of the loan rate over the deposit rate, we can also see that as substitutability
increases between the banks in the intermediate banking sector (￿H ! 1), it tends











vanishes, and therefore the
attenuation e⁄ects of ￿nancial intermediation themselves abate.
5 Dynamic Analysis
In this section, we explore the dynamic implications for monetary policy and the economy
in the presence of bank lending, against a backdrop of collaterally-constrained households.
To this end, we investigate two shocks in the context of the dual-household framework
with and without banks. The ￿rst is a standard monetary policy shock, while the second
is a collateral constraint shock. The latter is meant to capture the e⁄ects of ￿nancial
distress (or gain) by constrained households. Then we consider two shocks emanating
from the banking sector itself (which have no counterpart in the benchmark non-bank
model): a shock to the New Keynesian interest rate-setting relation, and a shock to
liquidity in the bank balance sheet, which is treated as a liquidity shock. First, we
discuss the calibration of the model.
5.1 Calibration
As is necessary with such large-scale models, several parameters were calibrated before the
model was solved. The calibrations chosen matched typical values chosen across the New
Keynesian literature, e.g. elasticities of substitution, labor shares in utility. In the goods
sector, the factor share of patient labor, ￿, was chosen to be 0:4. The shares of housing in
impatient and patient household utility were chosen to equal 0:1 as in Iacoviello (2005).
Given the uncertainty surrounding calibration, various ranges were chosen around some
of the more traditional New Keynesian parameters, given the complexity of the model. In
the Appendix, the speci￿c calibration parameters used to generate the impulse responses
are recorded, but in this section, we note and discuss the ranges chosen for the key
27parameters in the system. On reason was that simple sensitivity analysis revealed that
certain parameters exerted little e⁄ect at the extrema of each range, and so it was safe
for them to vary more than others.
The patient savers￿discount rate was varied between 0:99 and 0:998, and those of
the impatient borrowers between 0:95 and 0:98. The latter discount rates were chosen to
ensure that the collateral constraints bind in the steady state, namely the Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with the collateral constraints were greater than zero. These discount
rates suggest annual average real rates for patient households of between 0:8% and 4%.
Given the current calibration, the spread between the deposit rate and the loan rate in
the steady state is approximately 2:69%.
For the bank elasticity of substitution parameter ￿H, there was little guidance in the
literature. This was therefore reverse-engineered from historical averages of the USD
LIBOR, GBP LIBOR and EUR LIBOR rates, all obtained from the British Bankers￿
Association (BBA). The overnight indexed swap rates (Euronia and Sonia) were also
considered. Therefore ranges were also obtained for these parameters, 90 < ￿H < 170.
There was similarly little guidance for the Calvo parameter for the case of sticky interest
rates, ￿. As a starting point we used the empirical estimates from Huelsewig et al. (2006),
whereby ￿ was calibrated to 0:36.
Given the calibration of ￿H, this suggests a range of values for ￿, which must satisfy






. In this case ￿ < [0:006;0:01]. These
values for ￿ are extremely low and according to the Bank of International Settlements,
the average reserve requirement across OECD is approximately 10%. Therefore for the
purposes of our impulse response analysis, we set ￿ = 0.
The loan-to-value ratios for impatient households, ￿I was chosen to lie between 0:5
and 0:8, which captured the numbers reported in Iacoviello (2005) and Calza et al. (2007).
Given the presence on money and its inclusion in the system, it was necessary also to
calibrate the share of real money balances in utility. Once again, the literature was
scarce in suggested values, and so a value was chosen which was greater than or equal to
the share of housing in utility. Given that housing is not as convertible as money as a
medium of exchange, it seemed plausible to presume that households preferred to hold
more money, the most liquid asset, relative to other assets in their portfolios, i.e.
%P
"P ￿ 1.
5.2 What to Expect from the Model
As discussed earlier, it is important to get an idea of the key mechanisms that are at
work in the framework set out in the preceding sections. We recover two familiar e⁄ects,
which have been detailed in previous works: the collateral constraint e⁄ect, which has
the potential to amplify the impact of monetary policy actions, and the debt de￿ation
channel, which deals with the transfer of wealth from lenders to borrowers when in￿ ation
28rises, such that borrowers, who have higher propensities to consume, will be able to
consume more when in￿ ation rises.
However, as described in section 4:2, our model incorporates additional e⁄ects and
channels. We recover an attenuation of shocks for certain variables, due to the presence
of a spread between the loan and savings rates. The presence of the balance sheet
as a binding ￿nancial resource constraint on banking activity also leads to a unique
transmission of shocks between households and the rest of the economy.
Banking Attenuator and Interest Rate Spreads Should we expect to recover
an attenuation of shocks, or an even greater acceleration of the e⁄ects of monetary policy
changes, given the way we have introduced pro￿t-maximizing interest rate-setting banks?
As shown in section 4:2, we showed analytically the existence of a banking attenuator
e⁄ect that limits the monetary policy innovations on durables accumulation. Analogously,
a tightening of the collateral constraint, which re￿ ects an increase in the user cost of
durables, is dampened by the presence of a monopolistically competitive banking sector.
The introduction of price-setting in the banking sector is crucial to these results, as it
allows us to introduce a spread between the loan rate (RL
t ) and the deposit rate (RD
t ). On
the other hand, the impact of a monetary policy innovation on non-durables is magni￿ed
by the presence of a banking sector, given the choice of parameter values. And staggered
interest rate adjustment increases the magnitude of these competing e⁄ects on durables
and non-durables.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) identify a banking ￿attenuator￿ 22 as a mechanism
which tends to reduce the impact of monetary policy actions. The way this mechanism
operates is rather di⁄erent from the one presented in this paper. This attenuator e⁄ect
recognizes that any monetary stimulus to spending increases the demand for bank de-
posits, thereby raising the external ￿nance premium for a given value of collateral-eligible
assets in the economy - this is unique to the cash-in-advance (or transaction) constraint
that the paper uses, and works di⁄erently in our model. In the framework presented here,
there is no such constraint that nests a loan production function.
As noted before, the major contrast with the standard NNS models and those of Ia-
coviello (2005) and Monacelli (2008) is that the introduction of monopolistically compet-
itive banks leads to a divergence in the interest rates faced by households in the economy.
Therefore, it is no longer the case that monetary policy, which traditionally sets a single
interest rate via a Taylor rule in the NNS, directly in￿ uences the ￿ IS￿or demand-side of
the economy. This signals a move away from the ￿ money view￿of monetary transmission
22Gerali et al. (2008) develop a DSGE model with banking along the lines of Iacoviello (2005). They
discuss a banking attenuator e⁄ect due to the sole assumption of sticky interest rate-setting on deposits
and loans. We have shown that an attenuator e⁄ect on durables is present even under the assumption of
￿ exible interest rates. As explained in section 4:2, this is a direct consequence of having a monopolistically
competitive banking sector, which produces an endogenous spread between the loan and deposit rates
in the steady state. This fundamental attenuator mechanism is further magni￿ed by the assumption of
interest rate stickiness.
29where this unique interest rate is the summary statistic for all credit conditions in the
economy, simultaneously capturing the return on all assets present. There are now three
distinct interest rates in the model: interest earned on deposits by patient households,
RD
t ; interest earned by banks on loans to impatient households, RL
t , and an interbank
rate set by the monetary authority - usually charged by banks to one another for lending
- which serves as a proxy for the policy rate, RIB
t . In this situation it is necessary to track
the impact of monetary policy shocks via the loan supply functions, which characterize
how banks adjust credit and loan rates in equilibrium.
In our model, adjustments of the interbank (policy) rate by the central monetary
authority mean that both the loan rate and deposit rate move in the same direction. The
policy rate equals the deposit rate (due to our assumption of price-taking by banks in
the market for deposits), and the loan rate is marked-up over the deposit rate. Therefore
the only source for changes in the interest rate spread over time is via staggered interest
rate-setting by banks. Nevertheless, the mark-up between the loan rate and the deposit
rate is crucial in determining the strength of the attenuation e⁄ect from the presence of
banks, as shown in section 4:2.
Bank Balance Sheet Channel As discussed in the introduction, the bank lending
channel and traditional credit view note that banks have access to more than one type of
asset - at least one security as well as loans. An assumption of imperfect substitutability
of loans for other forms of securities (assets) in bank portfolios is then required such that
when a central bank reduces the volume of reserves, loans are also reduced.
In our model we do not have any form of substitutable assets for banks. Banks can
only make loans to impatient households and cannot buy any other assets. As such
therefore the traditional bank lending channel which relies on central banks engaging in
reserve management to a⁄ect the supply of loans via changing the liabilities side of the
balance sheet is not apparent.23 Instead, our model appears to include a bank balance
sheet channel, where changes in the liabilities side of the bank balance sheet have a direct
e⁄ect on the assets of the bank, and through this on to the amount of credit available
in the economy. We deliberately choose to refer to this channel as a bank balance sheet
channel as opposed to a bank lending channel, since a change in monetary policy cannot
directly a⁄ect the composition of bank balance sheet (via interest rates),24 as banks have
only one asset and one liability. The bank balance sheet is ultimately, in the context of
the simple banking framework we develop in this paper, the market clearing condition
for loans and deposits between households.
By considering a liquidity shock to the balance sheet of the bank, we attempt to
23The parameter ￿ captures the reserve requirement, however, the maximum possible value of ￿ that
would permit the collateral constraint to bind in the steady state (i.e. for ￿I > 0) is just under 1%.
As already noted, this is much lower than the average reserve requirement of 10% used by most central
banks and so we set ￿ = 0.
24However, the monetary authority could a⁄ect the balance sheet via the reserve requirement.
30explore this channel in more detail. For a given level of loans and deposits, we will see
that an exogenous increase on the liabilities side of the equation, will lead to a fall in
deposits and, depending on the persistence of the shock, a rise or fall in loans.25
5.3 The E⁄ects of adding a Banking Sector
In this section we compare the output from the model for the benchmark model with
banks to one without a banking sector. The Figures displaying the impulse responses for
each of the shocks we discuss are reported in Appendix C.
5.3.1 Monetary Policy Shocks
The Figures in Appendix C.1 shows the e⁄ects of a 1% shock to the monetary policy rule.
As in the standard NNS framework, an increase in the policy rate leads to an immediate
increase in ex ante real interest rates. In the case of ￿ exible interest rate-setting by
banks, this rise in the nominal rate also translates into a proportionate rise in the ex ante
real loan rate (
RL
t




Et[￿t+1] "). This rise would typically induce both sets of household to postpone current
consumption of non-durable goods, which follows from the two Euler equations (8) and
(18). The responses show that despite their impatience to shift consumption forward,
impatient households reduce consumption relatively more than patient households, since












Furthermore, this tightening of borrowing conditions for impatient households from the
contraction in the discounted value of their collateral is exacerbated by the fall in house
prices which follows the monetary policy contraction. Real loans, lt, therefore fall and de-
mand for both durables and non-durables falls, i.e. the e⁄ects on the collateral constraint
lead to complementary e⁄ects on impatient households￿consumption of both types of
good, which is captured in the responses.26 Therefore impatient borrowers see a fall in
nondurable consumption greater than that of patient savers.
As we noted earlier, the collateral constraint e⁄ect is such that as the relative price
of durables falls, the de-linking of asset prices from the user cost, means that the user
cost (MRS) in fact rises, leading to a substitution away from housing to non-durable
consumption. This reinforces the asset price e⁄ects on loan demand above and explains
25It is possible to interpret the shock to the balance sheet as a shock to the reserve requirement of the
banking sector.
26Given a ￿xed supply of durables (housing), patient durable consumption is always directly opposite
to that of impatient households. As they are unconstrained they smooth intertemporally and ￿ take up
the slack￿in the housing market, so to speak.
31why we see a larger e⁄ect on durables in the impulse responses. We also recover the
debt de￿ ation e⁄ect, as in￿ ation falls. There is a transfer of wealth from impatient
households (borrowers) to the patient households (savers) as the real cost of current
borrowing increases and the real return to current deposits increases.
How does the presence of banks a⁄ect these various channels? We ￿nd increasing
attenuation of most e⁄ects once banks are introduced, as set out earlier in section 4:2,
and an even stronger attenuation once the stickiness of interest rate-setting increases.
Therefore by simply comparing the model without banks to the model with ￿ exible
interest rate-setting banks, we ￿nd an attenuation of the drop in borrowers￿consumption
of durables. This latter response is also related to the attenuation of the collateral
constraint e⁄ect mentioned earlier, whereby the presence of banks means that the rise
in the MRS is smaller when banks set loan rates di⁄erently to savings rates. Therefore
the substitution from durables to non-durables is not as severe, and so instead impatient
households cut back relatively more on non-durable consumption, given their overall
diminished capacity to borrow due to lower collateral values.
When we compare the ￿ exible interest rate-setting bank model to the one with sticky
interest rates, the collateral constraint tightening, captured by the increase in ^ ￿
I
t, has
a stronger e⁄ect on non-durable consumption. With sticky interest rates and given the
calibration, we see an ampli￿cation of the fall in non-durable consumption compared to
the case of ￿ exible interest rate-setting.
The responses also show that the presence of banks has no real e⁄ect on the longevity
of the shock. The rate of the decay of the impulse to each variable is not signi￿cantly
altered when monetary policy changes are intermediated through banks, and therefore
banks no not appear to a⁄ect the propagation of the shock beyond attenuating (or accel-
erating in the case of non-durable consumption) the existing e⁄ects.
5.3.2 Collateral Constraint Shocks
In the ￿gures displayed in Appendix C.2, we show the e⁄ects of a shock to the collateral
constraint:




























represents the AR(1) loan demand shock and eL
t is an iid disturbance. In this case we
allow for some persistence of the shock by setting ￿L = 0:6. This positive shock is akin to
an outward shift in the loan demand schedule, which leans to an increase in loans and the
loan rate. However, in order to fund this increase in loans, banks must attract deposits
32which require an increase in the deposit rate. In the case of the non-bank model and
the bank model with ￿ exible prices, both the deposit rate and loan rate rise by the same
proportion. And given the mark-up of the loan rate over the deposit rate in the model
with banks, bank pro￿ts increase following the increase in loan demand.
The increase in loans means that impatient households experience a loosening of
their collateral constraint. Subsequently, their consumption of both durables and non-
durables can increase. These responses once again re￿ ect the complementarity between
the consumption of both types of good that a relaxation or tightening of the collateral
constraint induces.
The rise in deposits (savings) by patient households means that they postpone their
consumption of durables and non-durables, which both fall (the former changes in re-
sponse to adjustment by impatient households given the ￿xed supply of durables). The
responses also show that the fall in CP
t and HP
t is less than the rise in CI
t and HI
t respec-
tively, given the loosening of the collateral constraint and the higher marginal propensity
to consume of impatient households. Since the rise of impatient nondurable consump-
tion is greater than the fall of patient non-durable consumption, we see an increase in
aggregate demand, which leads to an increase in output. And to produce this increased
output, ￿rms must hire more labor and raise wages to induce greater labor supply.
Furthermore, in response to an increase in interest rates, we see asset prices, ^ qH
t , fall.
And as rates begin to fall following the initial impulse, we see asset prices rise once again.
There is an element of overshooting as prices adjust to ensure that the housing market
clears. In￿ ation also spikes as aggregate demand is boosted by the positive shift in loan
demand.
When we look at the responses as banks gradually adjust the loan rate, we ￿nd the
increase in aggregate demand has been mildly attenuated and therefore there is a smaller
increase in output relative to the ￿ exible price and non-bank cases. Consequently in￿ ation
also rises by a smaller amount and the slower change in loan rates also means that bank
pro￿ts rise by less.
This positive loan demand shock can be compared to a situation where the borrowing
opportunities of impatient households have increased. Parallels between such a relaxation
in constraints could be compared to a situation with an incipient bubble in house prices,
since an increase in expected future house prices (as could occur in a rational bubble)
can cause a similar outward shift in loan demand.
5.4 Bank Model Shocks
In this section we compare shocks, displayed in Appendices D.1, D.2 and D.3, which are
speci￿c to the banking model and look at the e⁄ects within the context of sticky and
￿ exible interest rate setting by banks. The issue of attenuation is no longer relevant here
33and so
5.4.1 Balance Sheet Shocks
We also investigate the e⁄ects of a 1% liquidity shock to the model in Appendices D.1
and D.2, whereby we shock the bank balance sheet as follows:













t is an iid innovation, and we look at the e⁄ects of the shock under zero and mild
persistence, ￿x = 0 and ￿x = 0:6 respectively. According to Bernanke (1983) banking
and ￿nancial crises, lead to di⁄erent types of large unplanned changes in the channels of
credit ￿ ow: (1) a fear of runs leading to large withdrawals of deposits; (2) precautionary
increases in reserve-deposit ratios, and (3) an increased desire by banks for very liquid or
rediscountable assets. These factors are ideally captured by this shock to the balance sheet
and can lead to a forced contraction of the banking system￿ s role in the intermediation
of credit and therefore to real e⁄ects on the economy.
Bernanke (1992) also set out empirically how a reduction in the volume of deposits
held by depository institutions, triggered by tight monetary policy, will a⁄ect a banks￿
balance sheet. The e⁄ect of the reduction in deposits starts immediately, grows gradually,
reaches its maximum after approximately three quarters, and appears to be permanent,
which means that bank assets fall along with bank liabilities. For the ￿rst six months after
the policy shock, the fall in assets is concentrated almost entirely in securities, with loans
hardly moving. However, shortly after, security holdings begin gradually to be rebuilt,
while loans start to fall and, after two years, security holdings have almost returned to
their original value, and the entire decline in deposits is re￿ ected in loans. The simple
bank balance sheet we introduce contains only one asset and one liability, and therefore
instead we capture an instantaneous impact on loans rather than a gradual e⁄ect.
When there is some persistence in the liquidity shock (Appendix D.2), i.e. ￿x > 0,
we ￿nd that loans increase initially following the positive impulse to the balance sheet,
before falling to match deposits, which fall on impact (but by less than when the shock to
the balance sheet is iid). The reasoning for the behavior of deposits and loans following
the shock is as follows: in order for (62) to hold it must be the case that either loans
increase or deposits fall, or both. Loans increase initially since ￿^ d1 < ￿"x
1, but from
approximately the 7th or 8th quarter the shock has mostly dissipated and the perfect
co-movement between deposits and loans due to the balance sheet is almost completely
restored.
34However, when there is no persistence in the liquidity shock (￿x = 0) in Appendix D.1,
we see a concurrent fall in loans and deposits occurs,.despite a seemingly ￿ positive￿shock
to the liabilities side of the balance sheet. This happens because an injection of funds
into the bank balance sheet means that less funding needs to be undertaken immediately
from deposits for the given amount of loans. Therefore we see deposits fall. Given the
balance sheet constraint, however, loans must also fall with deposits and so the supply
of loans falls relative to its steady state level. In particular, we can see that deposits fall
by more than the upward impulse from the liquidity shock, "x
t, to ensure that loans fall
in the period that the shock hits the economy, i.e. ￿^ d1 > ￿"x
1. From period 2 there is
no further shock, and the balance sheet constraint holds perfectly, such that ^ lt = ^ dt, for
t ￿ 2.
We also ￿nd that in￿ ation and output fall following this liquidity shock as in the case
of the negative monetary policy shock, whereas we see an opposite movement in house
prices. The reason for the fall in output is that this shock to the balance sheet shows up
negatively in the aggregate resource constraint:27
^ Yt = ^ C
P





and so represents a contraction in output.
Since there is no issue about banking attenuation in this case, we can look instead
at the e⁄ects on the spread between the loan and deposit rates. The increase in the
spread under mild persistence is greater than that with zero persistence, and we can see
that consumption of both durables and non-durables is accelerated by the presence of
the increasing changing interest rate spread when loan rates are sticky, as well as sharper
changes to real loans and deposits.
5.4.2 Interest Rate Setting Shocks
Finally, we turn to a shock to the New Keynesian interest rate setting relation which
was derived in section 2, the responses of which are reported in Appendix D.5. As with
the preceding liquidity shock, we can only examine this type of impulse in the case of
the bank model with ￿ exible vs. sticky loan rates. The shock will be to the loan supply
relation (31) - a ￿ credit supply￿ -side shock. This contrast to the ￿ credit demand￿ -side
collateral constraint shock. We treat the shock as a change in bank competitiveness on
the system, following the ￿ndings of Hannan and Berger (1991) and Borio and Fritz (1995)
reported earlier, and simulate a change to the degree of substitutability in bank loans.
Following the modelling strategy pursued by Steinsson (2003) and Smets and Wouters
(2003) to obtain a cost push shock in the NK Phillips curve, we assume that the elasticity
27This expression can be derived by combining the two household budget constraints with the housing
supply condition and bank balance sheet (62).
35of substitution in the demand for loans (￿H
t ) follows a log-stationary stochastic process.










In this case, we obtain the following interest rate-setting equation under the assumption

















































. Notice that the structural shock "RL
t will enter with a negative
sign into (66), implying that an increase in competitive pressure in the banking sector
(￿H
t > ￿H) - more elastic demand and lower mark-up of the loan rate over the deposit
rate - will increase the rate of change of the loan rate.
A cost-push shock in the banking sector translates into an increase in the full set of
interest rates in our model economy and in a drop in the supply of loans. Simultaneously,
a fall in loans means that banks require less deposits from patient savers to fund their
lending activities. This e⁄ect is determined by the fact that the loan supply schedule
is perfectly elastic, since the interest rate charged on mortgages is independent of the
amount of loans being issued. Therefore, a positive shock to the interest rate-setting
relation leads to an upward shift of the perfectly elastic loan supply schedule. And given
that loan demand is a negatively-sloped function in
h
^ l; ^ RL
i
-space, this translates into an
increase in the interest rate and fall in the amount of loans provided to the impatient
borrowers. This has e⁄ects on the household sectors in two ways.
First, impatient households shift from housing to non-durable consumption given the
fall in their funding opportunities. This fall in durables by impatient borrowers is greater
than the increase in the demand for housing by patient savers. This drives down the asset
price. As for patient consumers, as shown in equation (12), durables price dynamics are
perfectly re￿ ected in their consumption of non-durable goods. Therefore, the two impulse
responses will follow the same dynamic pattern following the shock. Patient consumers
will therefore initially increase their householdings, given the contracted price of durables
and the decrease in their deposits. Expected bank pro￿ts will increase, and the overall
e⁄ect on production and in￿ ation is positive.
365.5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to graft a pro￿t-maximizing interest rate-setting banking
sector onto a model with collaterally-constrained agents to produce a framework that
can track the e⁄ects of monetary aggregates, such as loans and deposits, and interest
rates on the real economy. Introducing banks in this way allows us to embed interest rate
spreads within the economy and see how they alter the traditional monetary transmission
mechanism in DSGE models. Exploring the role of banks and ￿nancial intermediaries is
particularly relevant given how the ￿nancial crisis had its genesis in the banking sector.
We uncover, both analytically and via impulse response analysis, that the banking sector
attenuates the e⁄ects from a number of shocks on most variables, due to the di⁄erential
loan and savings rates introduced.
Some light can therefore be shed on how the monetary transmission mechanism is
altered in the presence of a pro￿t-maximizing interest-rate setting banking sector. How-
ever, this is only the very ￿rst step, as there are a number of other issues embedded
within the most recent and preceding literature on banking which can be incorporated,
and indeed new puzzles and issues have been thrown up by recent events.
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40A Log-linearized Equilibrium Conditions
A.1 Patient Households
0 = ^ C
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A.5 Central Bank Interest Rate Rule
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42B Deterministic Steady States
This section sets out the analytical formulae for steady states:
￿ We assume that ￿ = (1 + ￿) = 1, i.e. in￿ ation is zero in the steady state;
￿ Housing supply is ￿xed: H = 1;















































Deposit Rate: RD =
1
￿
Interbank Rate: RIB =
RD
1 ￿ ￿
Mortgage (Loan) Rate: RL =
￿H
(￿H￿1)RIB

























































l = ￿5Y (102)
C
P = ￿7Y (103)
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B.1 Description of System
1. System Variables:
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￿ Goods Sector Variables: n
^ Yt; c mc
G
t ; ^ N
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28The complete set of log-linerized equilibrium conditions is reported in Appendix A.
44￿ Banking Variables: n
b ￿
B
t ; ^ R
L
t ; ^ R
D
t ; ^ R
IB
t ; ^ mt
o
2. Example Calibration:
Parameters Values Parameters Values
￿
P 0:99 ￿H 150
￿
I 0:97 ￿ 0
"P 0:1 ￿ 0:36
"I 0:1 ￿ 0:4
￿I 0:75 rR 0:8
’P 1:01 r￿ 1:5
’I 1:01 rY 0:1
￿P 1 ￿A 0:5
￿I 1 ￿x 0;0:5




45C Bank vs. Non-Bank Impulse Responses
C.1 Monetary Policy Shock
C.1.1 Sticky Bank (Solid) vs. Non-bank (Dashed) vs. Flex Bank (Dotted)
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46C.2 Collateral Constraint Shock
C.2.1 Sticky Bank (Solid) vs. Non-bank (Dashed) vs. Flex Bank (Dotted)
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47D Bank Impulse Responses
D.1 Balance Sheet/Liquidity Shock (Bank Model only)
D.1.1 Sticky Bank (Solid) vs. Flex Bank (Dotted), Zero persistence of Shock
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48D.2 Balance Sheet/Liquidity Shock (Bank Model only)
D.2.1 Sticky Bank (Solid) vs. Flex Bank (Dotted), Mild persistence of Shock
(￿x = 0:5)
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Shadow Value of Borrowing
49D.3 New Keynesian Interest Rate-Setting Shock (Bank Model
only)
D.3.1 Sticky Bank (Solid) vs. Flex Bank (Dotted)
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Shadow Value of Borrowing
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